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“I Am Better At Narrative Than
Analytic History”: Schlegel’s Version of
Intellectual History
G. EDWARD WHITE
It has been a stimulating and exhausting task to reread
much of John Henry Schlegel’s efforts, over several decades,
to work out his approach to doing history generally and
intellectual history in particular.1 That topic by no means
captures all of Schlegel’s scholarly pursuits—he has written
an astonishing amount on a variety of subjects since entering
the legal academy in the 1970s2—but I believe it to be central
to his search for a scholarly identity. All of us in the academy
engage in such searches, and among the goals of the searches
is figuring out one’s strengths and weaknesses as a scholar
and matching them up with topics whose pursuit serves to
maximize strengths. So I have tried to follow Schlegel along
as he came to the conclusion that he was “better at narrative

1. I am indebted to Fred Konefsky for pointing me in the direction of some
of those sources. Thanks to Fred and to Neil Duxbury for comments on an earlier
draft of this Article.
2. See John Henry Schlegel, Cirriculum Vita, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO
SCHOOL OF LAW (2020) at 2, http://www.law.buffalo.edu/content/dam/law/
restricted-assets/pdf/faculty/cv/schlegel_john_cv.pdf.
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than analytic history.”3 Sometimes I found following him
inspiring, and sometimes mentally tiring, and those
reactions were often connected.
I am seeking to pursue two inquiries in this meditation
on Schlegel. One is to try to figure out why he settled, fairly
soon after concluding that he was attracted to legal history,
on a particular conception of history in general, and of
intellectual history in particular, that he continued to defend
after others pointed out obvious difficulties with it. The other
is to analyze one of Schlegel’s most successful applications,
in my view, of his methodology, his 1984 article on the
formation of the Critical Legal Studies movement in the late
1970s.4 After pursuing those inquiries, I will close with some
general observations about Schlegel’s contributions as a
scholar.
I
Schlegel graduated from the University of Chicago Law
School in 1967 (a native of Mattoon, Illinois, he received a
B.A. three years earlier from Northwestern) and spent the
next year as a Teaching Fellow at Stanford.5 He had done
well in law school and perhaps had been inclined to
immediately seek an academic position, but in 1968 he took
a job as an attorney with the Legal Aid Society of Chicago,
where he remained until 1973, when he joined the Buffalo
faculty.6 I have not been able to find, among the numerous
comments Schlegel has made about his career decisions, any
indication of when and how he first got interested in doing

3. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 13 (1995).
4. John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and
Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV.
391 (1984).
5. SCHLEGEL, supra note 2, at 1.
6. Id.
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scholarship in legal history.7 He had no graduate training in
history, and was not part of an expanding circle of persons in
the early 1970s who had connections to a faculty-student
legal history workshop at Harvard, several of whose
members were hired as legal historians by law schools in the
1970s.8 As far as I can determine, his course offerings at
Buffalo during the 47 years in which he has been a member
of the faculty have centered almost exclusively in the
commercial
arena:
Contracts,
Commercial
Law,
Corporations, and Corporate Finance.
But as early as 1979, Schlegel had produced the first of
two articles,9 which were eventually incorporated into a
book, on Legal Realism and empirical social science. The
articles made it clear that he had become deeply immersed
in a particular version of legal history. Both of those articles
sought to answer two historical questions Schlegel thought
to be interconnected. The first was “[w]hy did law not become
7. Even Schlegel’s “notes” for the conference for which this Essay was
prepared, although they purported to give an “easy” answer to the question why
“[m]ost of what I have written . . . has been an effort to use history, including
contemporary history . . . as tools to understand why legal education and
educators, legal theory and legal practices are so strange,” didn’t give anything
like an answer, let alone an easy one. Jack Schlegel, Having Serious Fun –
History/Ideas/Law: Notes by Jack Schlegel, UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO: THE BALDY
CENTER FOR LAW & SOCIAL POLICY (2021), http://www.buffalo.edu/baldycenter/
events/conferences/Schlegel.html. All Schlegel said on the matter was that he had
been bored in law school because the doctrines he was taught didn’t seem to have
anything to do with the way law actually functioned; that he began to learn about
Legal Realism as a law student, “mainly on my own,” which reinforced an interest
in “how law operated”; and that that interest was reinforced by exposure to the
law and society movement, the first of the “law and” movements in the legal
academy in the late 1960s. Id. But the law and society scholars at the time were
doing law and sociology, not legal history.
8. For more detail on that cohort of American legal historians, whose entry
into the legal academy in the 1970s signaled a renaissance in legal history on law
school faculties, see G. Edward White, The Origins of Modern American Legal
History, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY AND
METHODS 48, 48 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy, eds., 2010).
9. John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 459 (1979); John Henry
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: The Singular
Case of Underhill Moore, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 195 (1980).
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a scientific study, in the twentieth-century sense of science
as an empirical inquiry into a world ‘out there,’ as did all the
other disciplines in American academic life that formed in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?”10 The
second was why American Legal Realism “as a coherent
intellectual force in American legal thought [ ] simply ran
itself into the sand.”11
Schlegel later said that he started thinking about those
questions when, in the spring of 1974, he “chanced on some
old files that once belonged to Charles E. Clark,” a professor
at and subsequently Dean of Yale Law School, and
“discovered a story worth telling.”12 The story was about
Clark’s and his colleague William O. Douglas’s efforts to use
techniques of empirical social science to reform legal
doctrines in the 1920s and early 1930s. By the time Schlegel
encountered Clark’s files, he had read some books on
Realism,13 and he believed that Clark’s files could help him
capture a dimension of Realism that those works had not
emphasized, namely the persistent interest in some scholars
associated with the Realist movement in conceiving law as a
social science featuring empiricist methodologies.14
Eventually Schlegel’s pursuit of that dimension of Realism
would result in his engaging in close studies, based largely
on archival research, of the work of not only Clark and
Douglas but Underhill Moore, Walter Wheeler Cook,
Herman Oliphant, Leon Marshal, and Hessel Yntema.
Schlegel’s archival work not only sought to show what
individual Realist scholars were seeking to do in launching

10. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 1.
11. Id. at 2. Versions of Schlegel’s 1979 and 1980 Buffalo Law Review articles
became chapters in this book.
12. Id. at 1.
13. Id. at 5–6 (noting WILFRED E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM
(1968); EDWARD PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973); and
WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (1973)).
14. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 8.
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their projects—the data they were attempting to gather, the
uses to which they sought to put that data, and the overall
purposes of their academic endeavors—but who those
scholars were—their professional contacts, friendships, and
animosities, their relationships with colleagues and
institutions, even, when allegedly relevant, incidents from
their personal lives. Schlegel’s experiences doing archival
work on Realist scholars convinced him of two things about
their ideas. One was that those ideas could not be understood
independently of the “context” in which they were situated.
By “context” Schlegel meant, essentially, everything that
was going on around the Realist scholars as they worked on
their projects: the economic climate of legal institutions in
the 1920s (flush) and the 1930s (depressed); the politics of
the law schools with which they were affiliated and their
competitor schools; incidents in their personal lives; and
their own idiosyncratic personalities. American Legal
Realism, for Schlegel, ended up being the aggregate of what
“Realist” scholars did and who they were. And the eventual
running of the Realist movement into the sand came when
the promise of its empiricist methodologies failed to produce
work that the legal academy or legal profession generally
found useful, a failure that was as much a product of the
human limitations of Realist scholars as it was of
methodological weaknesses.
Schlegel emerged from his immersion in archival sources
with a conviction that understanding legal ideas required an
understanding of the persons who articulated those ideas
and the connections of those persons to other persons,
institutions, and the larger culture in which they lived and
worked. That meant, for him, that “intellectual history”
could not be merely “the history of ideas,” because ideas
always had contexts, and contexts mattered.15 The result, in
Schlegel’s 1979 and 1980 Buffalo Law Review articles and
the book on which they were based, were narratives of the

15. Id. at 4–5.
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relationship of Realism to empirical social science in which,
as Schlegel’s longtime colleague Alfred Konefsky once put it,
“ideas and people” were “hopelessly intermingled.” 16
Schlegel might have chosen to treat his conception of
intellectual history as only based on the largely
uncontroversial assumption that ideas are invariably
situated in contexts, so that understanding them requires
attention to those contexts. Absent some unreconstructed
disciples of Leo Strauss,17 I doubt most contemporary
academic theorists would maintain that ideas are timeless,
being handed down over generations in a great chain of
being. But Schlegel has taken a more aggressive position on
intellectual history, characterizing it as “not the history of
ideas” but “the history of the intellectuals or other thinkers
and writers who made those cultural products we call
‘thought.’”18 Elsewhere he has suggested that “intellectual
history, as traditionally understood as a history of ideas
embodied in texts, is an essentially empty exercise.”19
For reasons I will subsequently set forth, I think that the
characterization of intellectual history Schlegel advances
cannot sensibly be maintained. But before detailing those
reasons I want to take up two additional features of
Schlegel’s characterization. One is that it rests on a
distinctive conception not just of intellectual history, but of
history itself. The other, which requires a more extended
discussion, involves Schlegel’s successive efforts to refine his
characterization in response to alternative conceptions of

16. Id. at 12. Schlegel’s response to Konefsky’s comment was “I do this
because, in my experience, ideas and people are usually hopelessly intermingled.”
Id. He went further in the “Afterword” stating that “[i]t is time that we consider
giving up the history of ideas, giving up intellectual history as a history of the
ideas of humans set apart from the rest of their lived experience, and to begin to
write the history of intellectuals.” Id. at 260.
17. See LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND HISTORY (1953) (illustrating
Strauss’s view of the relationship of ideas to history).
18. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 12.
19. Id. at 4.
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intellectual history, efforts I find, as I previously indicated,
simultaneously inspiring and exhausting.
In a response to a critical review of American Legal
Realism and Empirical Social Science in the Yale Journal of
Law & Humanities, Schlegel made some general
observations on history that I take to be driving his view of
intellectual history. He said:
We do ourselves ill by not recognizing the context in which we live
and work and then measuring our lives by that context. To wish to
measure ourselves by some context that we neither live in nor can
recreate is that ultimate act of ahistoricity by an intellectual
historian. . . .
. . . As best as I can tell there is no truth, only an absence of lies.
Though there are dozens of ways to recount the story that reaches
this conclusion, I would begin with the observation that the
Reformation killed the truth of revelation mediated by the Church
Universal. The Enlightenment killed the Reformation’s
understanding of truth as revelation directly accessible to the
believer. And the horrors associated with World War II killed the
Enlightenment’s notion of truth as revelation accessible through
reason alone. There is no longer (nor ever was there) a
transcendental, transpersonal, transhistorical basis for our value
judgments. We make them all up.
. . . My stories, my heroes, my valuable ideas are my attempt to
suggest, in the only way I as an historian know how, what stories
are important . . . which ideas are worth taking seriously. In aid of
this activity I have nothing but verisimilitude, a range of experience
hopefully shared with my readers, and the possibility that others
share or can be persuaded to share my values.
. . . As an author I ask others to consider whether by their own
lights . . . my stories are illuminating of a time past . . . the ideas I
value were useful for something at a time past.20

The crucial point of that excerpt, for me, is that it negates
a view of history as containing kernels of truth. Truth is not
only not “transcendental,” it is not “transpersonal.” Humans
“make up” truth in their value judgments. That can only
mean that the role of the intellectual historian is not to
20. John Henry Schlegel, No Lever and No Place to Stand (A Response to
Christopher Shannon), 8 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 513, 514 (1996).
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introduce readers to the “truth” of historical ideas, but to
persuade them, by recreating their context so as to achieve
“verisimilitude,” that the ideas were useful to
contemporaries in a past time. And that, for Schlegel,
necessarily means a full recreation of the context of past
ideas so that readers from a different time period get a sense
of why they might have been thought to be useful and
appealing. When one adds to that corollary from Schlegel’s
general view of truth in history his conviction that ideas are
the products of the collective thought of people who happened
to be “intellectuals or other thinkers and writers” at points
in time, one can understand how he reached the conclusion
that intellectual history cannot be equated with the history
of ideas per se.
Beginning in the late 1980s, Schlegel began to advance
his conception of intellectual history in a series of ambitious
book reviews. All of those reviews were actually essays in
which Schlegel dipped in and out of consideration of the book
in question to explore a number of other topics and works. It
is those digressions that I find both stimulating and
exhausting. One sits by Schlegel as he traces his engagement
with a variety of issues that attracted scholars on the
intellectual left of the American legal academy in the 1970s
and 1980s, particularly those who had connected in some
fashion with Critical Legal Studies. I found myself impressed
with the depth of Schlegel’s grasp of the issues, and of the
contributions of other scholars to understanding them. But I
also repeatedly wished that Schlegel would summarize the
point of his digressions and get back to addressing the book
under review.21
21. My impatience was accentuated by Schlegel’s writing style. Schlegel is one
of the gifted writers in the legal academy. When he chooses to, he can be
delightfully pointed or funny, and his self-assessment that he is very good at
telling stories is correct. But he also likes to remind his readers just how
complicated, and often unresolvable, certain “big” issues are, and he often does
that through conversations with himself on paper in which he drives deeper and
deeper into a subject, spinning out arguments and counterarguments along the
way. For just one illustration, see Schlegel’s discussion of epistemology,
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The books Schlegel reviewed, between 1989 and 1997,
were three of the most prominent works in legal history to
appear in that time period: Laura Kalman’s Legal Realism
at Yale, 1927-1960;22 Morton Horwitz’s The Transformation
of American Law, 1870-1960;23 and Neil Duxbury’s Patterns
of American Jurisprudence.24 He made use of all of the
reviews to set forth his conception of intellectual history. The
Kalman review stressed “the importance of fully socializing
intellectual history” by understanding that “changes in the
cast of characters” articulating ideas “suggest that ideas had
taken on new emphasis or meaning.”25 In the Horwitz review
Schlegel asserted that the work of scholars “gains meaning
for them in (and from) the web of social relations in which
they find (and place) themselves. . . . [I]t is here that life is
predominantly lived and so it is here, as a rule, historical
inquiry ought to start.”26 And in the Duxbury review Schlegel
noted that
When one leaves the cloistered halls of intellectual history proper
and examines biographies of participants in the high culture of the
North Atlantic . . . one sees people doing things other than thinking

linguistics, literary theory, and the “hermeneutic circle” in his review of LAURA
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960. John Henry Schlegel, The Ten
Thousand Dollar Question, 41 STAN. L. REV. 435, 442–53 (1989). Although
Schlegel began that discussion by claiming that it was a starting place for an
argument “about doing intellectual history generally,” id. at 442, and concluded
it with the observation that “understanding fully the culture of other thinkers’
doing and thinking, is the key to understanding an intellectual text,” id. at 453,
most of the discussion amounts to a very high-grade primer setting forth what
Schlegel gleaned from investigating the contributions of philosophers, linguists,
and literary theorists. And what Schlegel gleaned seemed to have simply
reinforced his view about what intellectual history actually consisted of.
22. Schlegel, supra note 21.
23. John Henry Schlegel, A Tasty Tidbit, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 1045 (1993)
(reviewing MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960 (1992)).
24. John Henry Schlegel, Does Duncan Kennedy Wear Briefs or Boxers?, 45
BUFF. L. REV. 277 (1997) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE (1995)).
25. Schlegel, supra note 21, at 464–65.
26. Schlegel, supra note 23, at 1057–58.
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or writing. One sees them falling in love, coping with families,
fighting with institutions or colleagues, enjoying friends, teaching,
moving about; in other words they can be found living and dying. . . .
Yet [biography] falls by the wayside when it comes to the generic
category “intellectuals” . . . Why do intellectual historians persist in
seeing the world in this way?27

In Duxbury’s account of “patterns” in late nineteenthand twentieth-century American jurisprudence, Schlegel
complained, “plenty of names” are mentioned, but “there are
no people, no places and no institutions described,” and thus
“no reasons for anyone to say what they are saying.”28 In
short, no “context” in Schlegelian terms: Duxbury’s account
was a history of ideas rather than a history of intellectuals.
By the appearance of Schlegel’s review of Duxbury,
American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science had
been published, and Duxbury had reviewed it.29 A
correspondence between Duxbury and Schlegel followed, and
Duxbury urged Schlegel to use the occasion of reviewing
Patterns of American Jurisprudence to clarify his views on
the practice of intellectual history.30 Duxbury’s review had
criticized Schlegel for failing sufficiently to meet what
Schlegel apparently believed was the central goal of
intellectual history: “the need to place . . . ideas . . . in their
full personal, social, and intellectual context.”31 The failure
had two dimensions. One was that Schlegel’s conception of
“context” was seemingly so broad that “[i]ntellectual
historians . . . must take everything into account—even, it
seems, that which is unaccountable.”32 Duxbury
particularized:
The writing of history requires that certain facts be considered more
important than others and that some things be treated as
27. Schlegel, supra note 24, at 279–80.
28. Id. at 292.
29. Neil Duxbury, Legal Realism for Legal Realists, 9 RATIO JURIS 198 (1996).
30. Schlegel, supra note 24, at 280 n.10.
31. Duxbury, supra note 29, at 201.
32. Id. at 203.
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irrelevant. Even if it were possible to place ideas “in their full
personal, social, and intellectual context”—and I do not believe for
one moment this is possible—the result, I suspect, would be rather
laborious and indiscriminate story-telling.33

Only Schlegel’s narrative gifts, Duxbury concluded, had
resulted in American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science being a book that was “anything but dull.”34
Duxbury’s second concern with Schlegel’s approach was
arguably even more telling. Schlegel’s version of intellectual
history, he suggested, did not “connect context with ideas.”35
Schlegel claimed that intellectual history needed to be “the
history of intellectuals, people who do things with ideas.”36
But in Duxbury’s view intellectual history needed to be
“more than that: It needs to account for what those people
actually attempt to achieve with their ideas; it ought also to
take account of how those ideas affect others.”37 But “ideas
hardly feature throughout Schlegel’s book.”38 For Duxbury,
Schlegel’s particular method of contextualizing ideas had the
effect of reducing the ideas to insignificance. That
consequence seemed notably ironic when Schlegel had
defined his project as an effort to connect up two “ideas” that
at one point occupied a prominent place in American legal
history, “Realism” as a jurisprudential approach and
“empirical social science” as a methodology.39 How could one
adequately explore that connection without making some
effort to understand what the ideas meant to persons
enthusiastic about them and what was the source of their
enthusiasm? But, as Duxbury notes, when Schlegel
“discusses what certain realists actually thought about law—

33. Id. (citation omitted).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 201.
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 201–02.
38. Id. at 202.
39. SCHLEGEL, supra note 3, at 1–2.

194

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

as opposed to how they tended to fill their days—he seems
peculiarly ill at ease with, even disinterested in his subject
matter.”40
It is intriguing to me that, in the face of Duxbury’s
criticism, which other reviewers of American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science had made as well,41 Schlegel
simply chose to double down on his view of how intellectual
history ought to be practiced. He insisted, in the Duxbury
review, on the same proposition about intellectual history
that he had advanced in the Kalman and Horwitz reviews,
that intellectual history as “the history of ideas” was an
“essentially empty exercise” because people, places, and
institutions were left out of that history.42 It strikes me as
rather bizarre that the same person who is clearly inclined
to delve deep into texts in an effort to make sense of the ideas
expressed in them—a practice of Schlegel that can readily be
seen in his lengthy, detailed digressions to consider a variety
of texts in the Kalman, Horwitz, and Duxbury reviews—
would then assert that texts containing ideas are
meaningless without being placed in their “full context.”
What was the point of Schlegel’s reading the texts in the first
place? Surely he was not treating Richard Rorty’s Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature as interchangeable with an
instruction manual for a washer/dryer.
Not all ideas are interchangeable; some ideas have been
treated as “worth more” than others by communities over
time. A history of those ideas, as Duxbury suggests, should
investigate not only why those ideas were regarded as
important at various times but what they were. That
investigation seems central to what intellectual history is
about: why would one even think of intellectual history as a
viable subfield unless one believed that identifying and

40. Duxbury, supra note 29, at 202.
41. See, e.g., James E. Herget, Book Reviews, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 396, 398
(1995).
42. See Schlegel, supra note 24.
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analyzing influential ideas over time was a coherent and
useful exercise? And why would Schlegel dismiss that
exercise as a methodological practice when he engages in it
himself?
I think the last question can partially be answered by
noting Schlegel’s self-description of himself as “pigheaded”
and by his penchant for playing the role of a provocateur. It
may be that when Schlegel first became attracted to
intellectual history in connection with the project that
eventually resulted in American Legal Realism and
Empirical Social Science, he was put off by what he felt was
the “idealist” character of much intellectual history
scholarship, which may have appeared to him to be
privileging the causal weight of ideas in history (as opposed
to materialist causes) and devoting an insufficient attention
to the sociological dimensions of knowledge. That reaction
would have been consistent with someone attracted to leftist
social theory and leftist politics in the late 1960s and early
1970s, when social historians were seeking to marginalize
intellectual historians in American history departments. So
it is possible that Schlegel began his work on the early
twentieth-century connections between Realism and
empirical social science as something of a social historian,
determined to “contextualize” ideas he felt had been
simultaneously treated in a vacuum and given too much
causal power. Shifting his focus from the content of ideas to
the people expressing them, and the places and institutions
in which they were expressed, was a form of social historian
strategy.
But having done that, Schlegel then chose to express that
strategy in the form of a polemical statement that
intellectual history was the “history or intellectuals” and
nothing else, and, when confronted with the entirely
intuitive rejoinder that one could hardly practice intellectual
history without devoting at least some attention to the
content and influence of certain ideas, to repeat his polemics.
He may have taken some comfort in doing so from his belief,
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previously quoted, that there is no epistemological “lever” or
“place to stand” from which one derives one’s methodological
and philosophical convictions; one just “makes them up” from
a sense that one is right.43 If so, what others perceive as
grave limitations on Schlegel’s view of intellectual history
does not provide a coherent reason for dismissing it. But it
may also simply be that Schlegel has been aware that his
polemics about intellectual history are bound to provoke, and
rather enjoys that.
II
Suffice it to say that I am among the ranks of those
inclined to treat Schlegel’s polemical description of what
intellectual history is and is not as “serious fun,” meaning
that he would enjoy defending it and critiquing “history of
ideas” enthusiasts along the way, but that in the end he
seems content to rest in the (possibly obfuscating) posture of
liking stories and being better at narrative than analytic
history. I now want to turn to one of the best-known
illustrations of Schlegel’s narrative history, one that draws
heavily on the people, places, and institutions he thinks play
a vital part in the “history of intellectuals.” The illustration
is Schlegel’s 1984 article in a symposium on Critical Legal
Studies in the Stanford Law Review.44
One can get a sense of Schlegel’s “narrative history”
perspective just from the title of the article. He called it
“Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate
History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies.” First,
“notes toward,” together with “intimate,” suggesting that
Schlegel’s “history” consisted of impressions by a participant
observer, not really a history at all.45 Second, “opinionated

43. See infra note 20.
44. Schlegel, supra note 4.
45. A suggestion reinforced by Schlegel’s writing, on the first page of the
article, that “the notion of my writing the history of an organization now about
seven years old . . . is clearly ridiculous.” Id. at 391.
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and affectionate,” suggesting that although Schlegel’s
“history” was written from a reservoir of goodwill toward his
subject, it was at bottom just those impressions, often
reflecting his idiosyncratic concerns. Finally, a history not of
Critical Legal Studies as a legal “movement,” such as
Realism, or as a set of ideas (by 1984 Schlegel had already
staked out his aversion to histories of ideas), but of the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies, which Schlegel
characterized as a “legal organization.”46 An institutional
history, perhaps, or a history of the people who formed and
administered the Conference, or the places where the
Conference was held, but very likely not a history of the ideas
generated and discussed at Conferences.
The last point was reinforced quite early in the article,
when, after a brief explanation of how the founding of the
Conference arose out of a meeting between Duncan Kennedy
and David Trubek in Cambridge in the 1976-77 academic
year,47 Schlegel turned to a commentary on the ideas
discussed at the Conference’s early meetings, the first of
which took place in Madison, Wisconsin in the spring of
1977.48 Kennedy, who had joined the Harvard faculty in
1971, was doing work in American intellectual history from
a perspective Schlegel called “Critical Marxism,” which
emphasized “the indeterminacy of social circumstances, and
thus the impossibility of deriving intelligible laws of
historical change, economic or otherwise.”49 Trubek, on the
Wisconsin faculty after having been denied tenure at Yale in
1973, had lost enthusiasm for the “law and development”
movement, which sought to infuse third-world nations with
“progressive” western legal values, and moved to a more
chastened posture that retained enthusiasm for law and
social science but eschewed what Schlegel called “Orthodox”

46. Id. at 392.
47. Id. at 392–95.
48. Id. at 398 n.25.
49. Id. at 393 n.9.
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or “Scientific” Marxism and its focus on a “labor theory of
value” and reform of “class-based ownership of the means of
production.”50 Kennedy and Trubek had in common leftist
politics, but more importantly, from Schlegel’s perspective,
the “seductiveness of a revivalist preacher” (Kennedy) and
ability to “make[ ]and maintain[ ] alliances with consummate
ease” (Trubek). 51 They were thus well suited to found a new
organization of legal academics, as well as having migrated
from a teacher/student relationship when Trubek had
Kennedy in a class at Yale to a close friendship.52
Kennedy’s and Trubek’s formation of the Conference
stemmed from their mutual interest in bringing together an
existing group of legal academics identified with the law and
society movement and a new group of leftist-leaning scholars
who had entered the legal academy in the 1970s.53 Their
goals in bringing those two groups together were to signal
the appreciation of the younger group for their elders’ having
deviated from traditional ways of legal scholarship and
teaching to explore the gap between “law on the books” and
“law in action,” and at the same time to subject law and
society scholars to critical assessments of their starting
intellectual premises.54 Initially Kennedy and Trubek seem
to have contemplated a “neat binary form” to the Conference
in which law and society types would engage with varieties
of Critical Marxists.55
At this point in Schlegel’s narrative one gets a clear
sense of that narrative’s priorities. He takes up, first, the
actual groups which emerged at the early conferences, and,
second, the principal perspectives exhibited by attendees in
group discussions. The “binary form” of discussion
50. Id. at 393 & n.9.
51. Id. at 392.
52. Id. at 393.
53. Id. at 394–95.
54. Id. at 395.
55. Id. at 394–96.
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anticipated by Kennedy and Trubek was immediately
destroyed by two of Schlegel’s core variables in the history of
intellectuals: place and people.56 Because the first
Conference was at Madison, Wisconsin, Trubek was its
principal organizer, and he recruited Mark Tushnet, at that
time Associate Dean of the law faculty, who “had a secretary
and easy access to duplicating facilities and other amenities
without which organizing a large meeting is impossible.”57 It
was Tushnet, in a January, 1977 letter inviting people to the
first Conference, who indicated that the younger
participants, while indebted to their law and social science
colleagues, “had chosen a path quite different from that of
their teachers.”58 But Tushnet, at the time he wrote the
letter, was a “Scientific Marxist,” ensuring that a third
perspective would be voiced in Conference discussions.59 It
was fortuitous that the Conference was held at Wisconsin
because Trubek was on the faculty; it was fortuitous that
Tushnet became an organizer and participant in the
Conference because he was Trubek’s colleague and Associate
Dean; and it was fortuitous that Tushnet’s then ideological
perspective was neither non-Marxist law and social science
nor Critical Marxism.
Schlegel then describes the interplay between the three
“leftist perspective[s]” which “achieved prominence” within
the Conference. He characterizes that interplay as a “game”
of “three-corner catch.”60 Most of the law and social science
types attending the Conference were not sympathetic to
Marxism as they understood it, and in that respect found
allies in Critical Marxists, who were not interested in issues
such as a labor theory of value and class ownership of the

56. Id. at 396.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 395.
59. Id. at 396.
60. Id. at 397.

200

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

means of production.61 On the other hand, Scientific
Marxists and law and social science enthusiasts shared a
“great emphasis on material culture,” as distinguished from
the Critical Marxists’ arguably “idealist” interest in ideas.62
Finally, both Critical and Scientific Marxists believed that
“the evil in the world is capitalism,” and were thus dismissive
of what they took to be the non-Marxist law and social
science adherents’ “apologetics” for a capitalist-based social
and economic order in America.63 And thus around the room
the ball is tossed,” Schlegel concluded.64 Hardly a conclusion
designed to attach any defining ideological identity to the
Conference. Moreover, Schlegel made no effort to suggest
where the ideas being tossed around in three-cornered catch
had come from, or why they might have been attractive to
the persons at the Conference who endorsed them. That is a
point to which I will later return.
And yet there was a sense in which, from its origins, the
Conference on Critical Legal Studies was ideological: certain
types of legal academics were not invited to it. One was what
Schlegel calls “doctrinaire Marxists referred to as ‘Guild
types’”;65 the other was “prominent liberals.”66 The first
group was excluded because the Conference’s organizers felt
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 399. The reference is to the National Lawyers’ Guild, an
organization of practitioners, many of them engaged in the representation of
labor unions, that was founded in the 1920s as an alternative to the American
Bar Association. Several members of the Lawyers’ Guild were also members of
the Communist Party of the United States in the 1930s. The group was
investigated by the FBI and the House Un-American Activities Committee in the
1940s. The image of members of the National Lawyers’ Guild, captured by
Schlegel’s description, was that they were doctrinaire ideologues whose primary
interest was in determining whether others had the “right” political perspectives.
See id. For more on the history of the National Lawyers’ Guild, see HARVEY
KLEHR, THE HEYDAY OF AMERICAN COMMUNISM (1984); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY
ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998).
66. Schlegel, supra note 4, at 399.
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that their presence might spawn intellectual disagreements
that would spill over into social ones and result in the
Conference becoming fractious.67 The second was excluded
because it was thought that their presence would distract
those singled out for invitation to the Conference in attacks
on liberalism which would “inhibit development of the
group’s own distinctive approaches to law.”68 And while,
after the first meeting, the Conference adopted an “open
door” rather than an “invitation only” posture towards
annual meetings,69 the searching critiques launched at
established law and social science scholars at the first
meeting resulted in an estrangement of member of the Law
and Society Association from the Conference and thus a
“conspicuous failure” of the “rapprochement Trubek and
Kennedy sought with the law and social science group.”70
Meanwhile “traditional liberals” tended to “avoid [the
Conference] like the plague,” and the organizers’ instinct to
avoid “Guild types” may have been confirmed when a paper
presented at the second annual Conference, at Northeastern
Law School in 1978, was “viciously . . . attacked for having
nothing to do with ‘the working class.’”71
Once again, in Schlegel’s narrative, people and places
are playing a central role, and ideas are secondary. It is less
important for him who may have “won” debates between
Critical Marxists and proponents of law and social science at
the first meeting than the personal dimensions of those
67. Id.
68. Id. Schlegel recounts an amusing incident in which Harry Wellington,
then Dean of Yale Law School, protested to Duncan Kennedy about the exclusion
of members of the Yale faculty, believing that the Conference organizers did not
find their work sufficiently stimulating. Id. at 399–400. When Kennedy
responded that the Yale faculty members were being excluded not because of
their intellectual firepower but because of their politics, Wellington reportedly
was “wholly satisfied,” reassured that his faculty did not contain a bunch of crazy
leftists. Id. at 400.
69. Id. at 400.
70. Id. at 408.
71. Id. at 399–400.
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debates, which caused some members of the law and social
science group to denounce their critics and others to feel that
they were not “wanted” in the organization.72 When ideology
does seem to be central, as in the attack by a “Guild type” on
a paper for being insufficiently attentive to class control of
the means of production, Schlegel implies that sort of posture
is counterproductive.
In the end people, and to a lesser extent places and
institutions, seem to be what Schlegel believes the
Conference is fundamentally about. We learn about Peter
Gabel’s “curly black locks and earnest, terminally tired eyes”
as well as his “wonderfully dense and contorted prose.”73 We
glimpse the “balding, almost elfin” Morton Horwitz as he
“embarrassedly defend[s] his latest attempt to salvage his
limited version of the socioeconomic determinism of legal
ideas.”74 We witness members of the group, in successive
annual meetings, “trading pictures of one’s children” and
“spotting a few old friends,” after which “the hugs, kisses,
and handshakes start.”75 We deplore the absence from a
meeting of Alan Freeman, “whose manic energy and
relentless optimism has surely infected everyone,”76 or Karl
Klare, “a wonderful combination of high seriousness and
warm, open goodwill,”77 or Rand Rosenblatt, “whose bald
Lenin-like profile gives the impression of a fierceness that is
simply nowhere to be found in his humane inside.”78 All this
means, for Schlegel, that the Conference on Critical Legal
Studies should be best understood as “a group of individuals
providing each other with tremendous mutual support.”79 So
72. Id. at 408.
73. Id. at 402.
74. Id. at 402–03.
75. Id. at 409.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 411.
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in the end the “history” of the Conference is another
illustration of “ideas and people” being “hopelessly
intermingled.”
III
Part of the reason Schlegel’s 1984 narrative about the
Conference remains cited and anthologized over thirty years
after it appeared is that it makes a strong case for Schlegel’s
view that intellectual history is the history of intellectuals,
primarily affected by people, places, and institutions.
Schlegel’s narrative of the Conference represents a slight
exception to his intellectual work as a whole in that the
substance of ideas can occasionally be glimpsed behind the
sketches of personalities discussing them and the social
atmospheres in which they are discussed. Critical Marxism,
Scientific Marxism, and non-Marxist law and social science
are somewhat encapsulated, so when one imagines Mark
Tushnet and Stewart Macaulay, still colleagues at Wisconsin
in the mid-1980s, off in a corner debating whether American
legal institutions can only profitably be understood as objects
of a capitalist order, one has some inkling of the “Scientific
Marxist” and law and social science perspectives informing
that debate. But despite his occasional efforts to set forth the
principal ideas being tossed around in the three-cornered
game of catch being played at Conferences, one still has the
sense that Schlegel thinks it more important that “the quite
tentative, very cliquish, even conspiratorial beginning of the
Conference seems to have passed,”80 and “the group has
become incredibly friendly, even clubby,” with “annual
meetings becom[ing] much like the gathering of a clan.”81
Schlegel wants his readers to conclude that that
development is not only “good,”82 but important, for the
history of Critical Legal Studies will be, at bottom, the
80. Id. at 408.
81. Id. at 409.
82. Id.
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history of the people in it.
I have a good deal of admiration for Schlegel’s ability to
provide telling details in the sketches of “intellectuals” whose
history he recounts. Learning that Peter Gabel and Alan
Freeman smoked “big black cigars” in a “secluded corner of
David Trubek’s yard” during the first Conference, or that
Trubek and Roberto Unger, “seated in a peacock chair,”
talked “South American politics,” either in Spanish or
Portuguese, at the same event,83 is perhaps a better way to
grasp the atmosphere of the first Conference than noting
that versions of Scientific Marxism, Critical Marxism, and
non-Marxist law and social science were deployed by
participants. But then one needs to recall, as part of the
history of Critical Legal Studies, that sometime in the late
1980s the Critical Legal Studies movement did not actually
run into the sand, but certainly ran out of steam in the legal
academy, and the reason for that was not that Duncan
Kennedy and David Trubek and Mark Tushnet and the
movement’s other founders became supporters of Ronald
Reagan or retired to the Florida Gold Coast, but because two
things happened to the central ideas of the movement.
One was that one of the principal methodological
innovations of Critical Legal Studies—popularized as the
“trashing” or “flipping” of established legal doctrines so as to
show their internal contradictions and possibly their
incoherence—was adopted by law teachers who did not share
the group’s political leanings. By using those techniques
critical legal scholars had reinstituted the centrality of
doctrinal analysis to law teaching, and “mainstream” legal
academics piggy-backed on that emphasis, at the same time
developing more sophisticated ways to unpack legal doctrine.
Thus one of the major critical weapons of CLS scholars,
deconstructing the doctrinal structure of “liberal”
scholarship and teaching, was domesticated.84
83. Id. at 408.
84. For more detail, see G. Edward White, The Inevitability of Critical Legal
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Another innovation of critical scholars had been the
“turn to history” in their work, mainly to show the
contingency and time-boundedness of established doctrinal
formulations. Other scholars began to participate in that
historical turn, but with quite different normative agendas
from those affiliated with CLS, so that “doing history” came
to have a far less radical thrust within the legal academy,
further contributing to the domestication of CLS
methodologies.85
Alongside that domestication came an estrangement of
many legal academics from the political goals of Critical
Legal Studies. The relentlessly anti-hierarchical thrust of
the movement seemed to point in the direction of challenges
to any activities within the legal academy that seemed
“authoritarian,” even if they took the form of delegating some
institutional
decisions
to
committees
or
Deans.
Confrontation, debate, and defiance of authority appeared to
be goals of the CLS movement with respect to law school
governance, and many legal academics found those goals
tiresome or even exhausting. The CLS slogan that “Law Is
Politics” may have seemed energizing to those attracted to
the movement, but it seemed to invite an abandonment of the
concept of “merit” which had played a decisive role in
twentieth-century legal education. If one could not
confidently say that some students were better than others,
or some scholarship “worth more” than others, or even that
law faculty deserved to be paid better than custodians, it
seemed hard to imagine how law schools could effectively
function. After an initial counter-move to oppose criticallyinspired proposals and even purge some untenured critical
scholars from law faculties, the legal academy, in the 1990s,
settled into a posture in which CLS methodologies became
widely adopted in scholarship and teaching and CLS political
proposals were largely ignored or forgotten.
Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1984).
85. For more detail, see G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in
Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 485 (2002).
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That brief history suggests that the partial eclipse of
CLS in the legal academy around the turn of the twentieth
century was not primarily a function of people, places, or
institutions. To be sure, there was a highly publicized
interval of polarization on the Harvard law faculty, where
opponents of CLS emerged and for a time tenure decisions
and appointments were affected by open political divisions.86
But in the end CLS was partially embraced, and partially
rejected, by most American law faculties because of the ideas
associated with the movement. Schlegel’s effort to encourage
us to understand the Conference on Critical Legal Studies as
part of a “history of intellectuals” presents us, like much of
his work, with riveting personal and institutional portraits,
but ultimately one worries, in scholarship purporting to do
intellectual history, where the ideas are. Put another way,
Schlegel’s emphasis on persons, places, and institutions has
the effect of subsuming ideas in those topics, so that
Schlegel’s narrative history becomes not so much one of
“ideas and people, hopelessly intermingled,” but of ideas
peeking around the portraits of people and places, mainly
being lost from sight.87
86. For more detail, see David Margolick, Education Watch: The Split at
Harvard Law Goes Down To Its Foundation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 1985).
87. For a more recent illustration of this tendency in Schlegel’s work, see John
Henry Schlegel, Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld: On the Difficulty of Becoming a Law
Professor, in THE LEGACY OF WESLEY HOHFELD (Shayam Balganesh, Ted
Sichelman & Henry Smith, eds., forthcoming). That essay is a compelling
reconstruction of Hohfeld’s career path from the time he first expressed interest
in becoming a legal academic in the first decade of the twentieth century to his
untimely death in 1918. One gets a very good sense of the activities and
aspirations of American law professors in those years. But there is almost no
substantive discussion of Hohfeld’s scholarship, most particularly his article,
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16 (1913), which launched Hohfeld’s visibility as a legal scholar and secured
him an appointment to the Yale law faculty after Arthur Corbin read a draft of
the article and was impressed by it. Given Schlegel’s demonstration of how
difficult a personality Hohfeld was, his rise throughout the hierarchy of American
law schools between 1908 and 1914 was surely not a result of his personal charm,
but of the perceived quality of his scholarship. Yet one does not get a sense, in
Schlegel’s narrative history of Hohfeld’s career, of why his jurisprudential ideas
were highly regarded, or even what they were.

